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Tort Liability of Teachers and Administrators
For Negligent Conduct Toward Pupils
Reynolds C. Seitz*
T IS APPROPRIATE at the outset to state the basic purpose of this
article. The term "tort" is applied to a group of civil wrongs, other
than breach of contract, for which a court will afford a remedy in the
form of an action for damages. The word "liability" in the title connotes
that school personnel who ignore the dictates of tort law can be held re-
sponsible for damages. The threat of damages is not, however, the pri-
mary reason for undertaking this discussion. Neither is the basic purpose
prompted by the possibility that school administrators and school boards
may be induced to take action by way of discipline against school per-
sonnel who disregard the responsibilities thrust upon them by tort law.
Nor does the article lose its significance because insurance can be bought
which protects against the impact of damages. School people above all
others in society should realize that money awards can seldom fully
compensate for injuries to pupils.
The real reason for this article is found in the recognition that good
law is generally a guide to good conduct. School people ought to know
as much about what the law dictates in respect to conduct toward chil-
dren under their supervision as they know about the teachings of
psychology.
Before getting directly into the discussion, it seems appropriate to
stress that there is nothing in tort law which makes teachers or admin-
istrators the insurers of the safety of children. Accidents will continue
to happen which cause injury to children in school. If, however, the
teacher or administrator has not fallen down in a responsibility which
he owes to the injured child, the law does not blame the teacher for the
accident.
Under tort law the basic responsibility of a teacher or administrator
is no different than that which rests generally on every member in
society. An individual must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omis-
sions which he can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure his
neighbor. Courts recognize that pupils fall within the category of neigh-
bors so as to cause teachers and administrators to have them in con-
templation when they act or omit to act. The concrete duty imposed
by this attitude is that teachers and administrators must act toward
pupils as would a reasonable, prudent person under the circumstances.
Of course, the circumstances with which teachers find themselves
confronted can become very complex. Enlightened courts are aware of
the fact that an unrealistic interpretation of tort law could make the
educator so fearful that he would not do things which might have great
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educational value. A firmly established principle of tort law assists en-
lightened courts in avoiding such outcome. Prosser, a recognized author-
ity in the area of tort law, in his volume on Torts, has stated the principle
that "against the probability and gravity of risk must be balanced the
utility of the type of conduct in question." I The recognized problem is
whether the game is worth the candle and the realism of appreciating
that sometimes a relatively slight risk may reasonably be run with the
full approval of the community. Certainly, to take one example, the
principle stated by Prosser ought to in many instances protect the
teacher who would permit a small group of three or four students to
remain in a classroom without supervision in order that they might
complete a research project. Particular circumstances could, of course,
not be totally disregarded. For instance, if one of the group was a known
serious troublemaker who was prone to engage in horseplay, it would
not be prudent to remove him completely from the area of supervision.
Duty of Supervision
A review of the cases raising the issue of negligence because of
improper supervision clearly indicates that the courts recognize that
manpower is such that schools cannot offer foolproof supervision. The
test often becomes whether the most prudent plan of supervision has
been worked out. A recent case, decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia,2 illustrates such fact and also
shows an application of the principle that against the likelihood and
gravity of harm there must be weighed the utility of the conduct. In
that case, Butler, a junior high pupil, was struck in the eye by a piece
of metal thrown by a student as he entered the print shop classroom to
which he was assigned for instruction. At the time, the printing class
teacher was out of the room. The teacher did not get into the room until
five to ten minutes after the class was scheduled to start.
Action was brought on the ground of negligent supervision. Evi-
dence showed that the reason for the absence was an assignment made
by the principal to duty as a hall or cafeteria supervisor during the
lunch period. The principal had drawn up a plan designed to place
teachers in positions where supervision was most needed. The enroll-
ment was 1,200. In an effort to provide for maximum safety and order,
teachers were deployed in various places outside their own classrooms
during certain periods when students were generally outside the class-
rooms.
The principal had given the students in the printing class (14 stu-
dents) certain specific rules they were to follow if the teacher was
absent at the start of class.
In reacting to the allegation of negligence, the court stated:
Thus, faced with the knowledge that children, and especially 13-
year-old boys, will throw at, kick, hit or push a fellow pupil if a
teacher is not immediately present, and using the available super-
' W. PRossrR, LAw or TORTS 122 (2d ed. 1955).
2 Butler v. District of Columbia, 417 F. 2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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visory personnel, the authorities balanced the need for a teacher to
supervise several hundred students milling about the corridors and
the cafeteria against the need to supervise 14 students in a certain
classroom for a short period of time.
The court stressed that there was a plan of supervision, and the
plaintiffs did not challenge the plan but simply said there was negligence
because the teacher was absent from the classroom. "Liability," said the
court, "is not established by such allegation or evidence."
A dissenting judge quarreled with the fact that the case had not
gone to the jury for consideration as to why the printing type could not
have been closed up in some way.
In a 1970 case 3 the California Supreme Court showed displeasure
with a plan for supervision of a large group of students during the lunch
hour. The facts involved two boys who, after finishing lunch, went to-
ward the gymnasium building about 1:00 p.m. (next class was at 1:16).
The boys stopped outside the north side of the gymnasium building
where the injured party and his friend engaged in "slap boxing" (using
open hands). One boy fell backwards when slapped and suffered a
fractured skull which resulted in death a few hours later. There was no
supervision in the area at the time of the boxing episode.
According to the plan in effect, all 2,700 high school students ate
lunch during one session. While they were actually eating, students
were required to remain in either the indoor cafeteria or the enclosed
outdoor area. When they were finished eating, however, they were free
to use any part of the 55 acre campus except the parking lot. Provision
was made for three administrative personnel and two teachers to super-
vise during the lunch period, and the area around the gymnasium was
made the responsibility of the physical education department. The court
found the plan defective because of lack of specificity as to the use of
physical education personnel. It said:
There was evidence ... to the effect that the responsible department
head had failed to develop a comprehensive schedule of supervising
assignments and had neglected to instruct his subordinates as to
what was expected of them while they were supervising. Instead,
it appears that both the time and manner of supervision were left
to the discretion of the individual teacher.
An allegation most frequently made against a teacher by the repre-
sentative of an injured pupil is that the teacher was negligent by reason
of not giving the proper supervision required by the circumstances. If
the trial court feels that the evidence leans very heavily in one or the
other direction, it may direct a verdict. Most often, however, the trial
court will send the matter to a jury with instructions on the law which
it thinks applicable. Appellate courts will sometimes find the instruc-
tions improper. Attitudes of appellate courts in various jurisdictions dif-
fer somewhat on the standard of supervision required. Some courts
seem excessively liberal in giving protection to teachers, and teachers
3 Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3rd 741, 470 P. 2d 360, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 376 (1970).
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would be prudent not to place too much reliance in the philosophy such
courts express. Too many other courts do not show such liberality.
Even in a jurisdiction which seems presently to allow liberal philosophy,
the next case could bring a reversal.
One of the most recent cases to exhibit a liberal reasoning in a
supervision situation was decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
4
A fourth grade teacher left her classroom for about five minutes to go
to the principal's office to inspect the record of a child. At the time, her
pupils were engaged in a program of calisthenics. The program of studies
permitted such physical education endeavor to be conducted in a regular
classroom by the regular teacher on days when the physical education
teacher did not take over. There were 30 children in the teacher's class.
The classroom was a rather traditional type with usual equipment. On
the day when the injury occurred, the weather was inclement and the
regular classroom was used for the calisthenics. Before she left the room,
the teacher spaced the children around the room an arms distance apart.
She then played a record which most of the children knew and told them
to follow the record in the manner directed. She told the children she
was going into the office and stressed that they should not move from
the positions assigned. She stayed for a few minutes to see how every-
thing was going and then went out.
After she left the room, one boy deliberately shifted his position and
as a result kicked a girl pupil in the head, causing her head to hit the
floor and her teeth to come out.
The teacher had previously recommended that the boy who shifted
his position needed psychological study and admitted that on occasion
the boy had disobeyed instructions.
The lower court found the teacher negligent and would have per-
mitted the recovery of damages by the injured pupil. The lower court
felt that it was the teacher's negligence in leaving the room, which was
the proximate cause of the injury.
The Court of Appeals thought otherwise. It felt that since the facts
were admitted, the lower court should have directed a verdict in favor
of the defendant. The Appeals Court said:
In our view the proximate cause of Mary's injury was an intervening
and wholly unforeseen force-the fact that Bobby left his assigned
place and did not do his push-ups as he had been instructed to do.
At another place the court adopts the language that:
Variously stated, the universally accepted rule as to the proximate
cause is that, unless an act, or omission of duty, or both, are the
direct and continuing cause of an injury, recovery will not be
allowed. The negligent acts must continue through every event and
occurrence, and itself be the natural and logical cause of the injury
* . . where the negligence of any one person is merely passive and
potential, while the negligence of another is the moving and effective
cause of the injury, the latter is the proximate cause of the injury
and fixes the liability.
4 Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109, 259 A. 2d 794 (Ct. App. 1969).
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The Court stated that:
The teacher had no reason to apprehend that any child would leave
his assigned place or that any of the children would perform the
exercises improperly. . . . To say that Bobby's acts should have
been foreseen by the teacher would be sheer conjecture.
The court was so sure of its position that it indicated that "while
proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact, it becomes a question
of law in cases where reasonable minds cannot differ."
One of the cases the Maryland court relied upon was the New York
Court of Appeals decision in Ohman v. Board of Education.5 In that
case, in a 3-2 decision, the court overturned a jury verdict finding of
negligence when a boy was hit in the eye by a pencil thrown while the
teacher was out of the room. The court in Ohman talked about no proof
of similar accidents; the accident could have happened while the
teacher was in the room, and the pencil was not a dangerous instru-
mentality and, therefore, the teacher's absence was not the proximate
cause of the injury.
Not all courts follow the philosophy of Ohman. Some of the cases
cited by the Maryland court did not follow it, although the court tries
to distinguish them. The dissenters of the appeals court in Ohman (2 out
of 5), and majorities in other courts, feel that a teacher could foresee
that absence from assigned duties in a classroom might encourage some
kind of "horseplay" and that, if such event does happen, it is im-
material that the exact injury need be foreseen. In their view, some-
thing like a pencil can be a dangerous instrumentality.
In spite of the broad language which the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals used in discussing proximate cause, and in spite of citing Ohman
as one of those cases on which it relied, there is some indication that
the court would have been concerned if the teacher had been out of the
classroom for a substantial period of time. The court drew attention
to a California case6 which referred to a long absence from supervising
as "imprudent." In Ohman the New York court had said it was not
concerned with the facts on the length of absence because it was im-
material on the matter of proximate cause.
The reason it cannot be said with certainty that the Maryland Court
of Appeals would have had a different viewpoint if the absence from the
classroom had been longer is because it was able to distinguish from the
California7 case where liability was found after injury to a child through
horseplay when a teacher absented herself from lunchroom supervision.
The court noted that a statute required supervision during such period.
In Ohio' a court has adopted the Ohman philosophy. The facts in-
dicated that a teacher was out of the room when one pupil threw a
milk bottle which struck another pupil in the head, causing him even-
5 300 N.Y. 306, 90 N.E. 2d 474 (1949).
o Forgnone v. Salvadore Union Elementary Dist., 41 Cal. App. 2d 423, 106 P. 2d 932
(1940).
7 Id.
s Guyten v. Rhodes, 65 Ohio App. 163, 29 N.E. 2d 444 (1940).
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tually to lose the sight of one eye and impairing the vision in the other.
On the point that the milk bottle could have been thrown while
the teacher was in the room, the courts which differ with those in Mary-
land, New York, and Ohio would stress that it would be much less likely
to happen if the teacher were present in the room.
In the state of Washington,9 where the ability to foresee the exact
injury was more difficult than in the New York, Ohio, and Maryland
cases, the court found no problem in finding a physical education teacher
liable who left the gymnasium unsupervised when during his absence a
boy dragged a girl into an adjacent room and perpetrated an immoral act.
One of the most recent pronouncements differing with positions
similar to those taken by the Maryland, New York, and Ohio courts on
the matter of the significance of failure to supervise was expressed by
the Supreme Court of California 0 in the "slap-boxing" case previously
discussed. The Court commented:
The fact that another student's misconduct was the immediate pre-
cipitating cause of injury does not compel a conclusion that negli-
gent supeirvision was not the cause of Michael's death. Neither the
mere involvement of a third party nor that party's wrongful conduct
is sufficient in itself to absolve the defendants of liability, once a
negligent failure to provide adequate supervision is shown . . . Nor
is this a case in which the intervening conduct of the other student
is so bizarre or unpredictable as to warrant a limitation on liability
through the expedient of concluding, as a matter of law, that the
negligent failure to supervise was not the proximate cause of the
injury. There was testimony . . . that "roughhousing" and "horse-
play" are normal activities for high school boys and it is the function
of adult supervision to control just such conduct .... Of course, it
is not necessary that the exact injuries which occurred have been
foreseeable; it is enough that "a reasonably prudent person would
foresee that injuries of the same general type would be likely to
occur in the absence of adequate safeguards."
The reasoning of the California court appeals to this writer. It is
submitted that teachers, looking for the guidance found in good law,
follow the dictates of the California court.
Of course, situations can arise when absence from supervisory re-
sponsibilities is indeed not the proximate cause of an injury. If, for
instance, a physical education teacher were to leave the gym floor while
pupils were playing a basketball game and the game were to go on as
usual, without horseplay, but two boys collide and severely injure each
other, the absence of the teacher from the floor would truly have nothing
to do with the accident.
A very particular responsibility in respect to supervision rests upon
teachers who instruct in areas where students work with equipment,
materials, and machines which are inherently dangerous if care is not
used. Shop, physical education, science, and home economics teachers
work in such areas.
9 McLeod v. Grant County Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P. 2d 360 (1953).
10 Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3rd 741, 470 P. 2d 360, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 376 (1970).
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Such teachers have more than a duty to give reasonable supervision.
They have the duty to give careful instruction in the use of the various
instrumentalities. A recent Wisconsin"1 case illustrates the duty in an
unusual way. The Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained a finding of
negligence in the case of one injured while using a machine in a vo-
cational school. Evidence showed that the injured plaintiff had not been
given proper advance instruction on how to operate a complicated high
speed machine and of the necessity of having a guard in proper position.
On the latter point facts indicated that the instructor was lax in en-
forcing safety regulations. The case is particularly interesting because
the injured person was 21 years of age and had a job working with
machines during the day. He had, in the year before the accident, been
given a set of instructions which pointed out the proper operation of ma-
chines at the school and warned against certain dangers. Without saying
so in so many words, it was obvious that the court did not feel it was
reasonable to fully charge plaintiff with continuous warning on the basis
of a notice received in 1961 when he did not begin to work with the
machine until 1962. Under the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute,
the court did conclude that the plaintiff was 25 percent negligent. The
court also noted that, although the plaintiff worked with machines at his
employment, they were not of the complicated type with which he was
to work at the vocational school. It should be obvious that if there is a
duty to give careful instruction to an adult, there is even more need to
give it to elementary and high school pupils.
There are, of course, a great variety of situations, other than class-
room, which call for some degree of supervision. School authorities have
certain responsibilities in respect to supervision on field trips, at dismissal
time, at periods of movement between classes, at school sponsored
activities such as dances and athletic contests, and in connection with
gatherings of pupils before and after classes. The present writer has dis-
cussed the application of basic principles to such situation in a previous
article in the Hastings Law Journal.12 Limitation on space does not sug-
gest coverage in this discussion.
Equipment As Attractive Nuisance
Administrators are often worried about the possibility that certain
equipment found on school playgrounds may be held by courts to be an
attractive nuisance, so that if a child is injured on the equipment while
it is not supervised, liability will be incurred. Recently an Illinois Appel-
late Court 13 dealt with a very interesting case involving the issue of
attractive nuisance. The assertion was made that various playground
equipment, including the higher of two slides, were inherently attractive
to young children. The Court responded by stating:
A plaintiff in tort litigation for personal injuries must allege facts
. . . which will raise a duty. The social utility of furnishing slides
11 Seversen v. City of Beloit, 42 Wis. 2d 559, 167 N.W. 2d 258 (1969).
12 Seitz, Legal Responsibility Under Tort Law of School Personnel and School Dis-
tricts as Regards Negligent Conduct Toward Pupils, 15 HASTIXGS L. J. 495 (1964).
13 Chimerofsky v. School Dist. No. 63, 121 Ill. App. 2d 371, 257 N.E. 2d 480 (1970).
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for pleasure and enjoyment of children is a commendable function
of governmental bodies at all levels. The existence in this state of
many unsupervised public playgrounds and public recreational fa-
cilities that provide playground slides is common knowledge.
The cost and burden of supervising . . . and requiring children to
be sorted out because of age, height, weight, and attitude and di-
rected to and from higher and lower playground slides would be
such a burden and duty, in view of the risk involved, to require
elimination of most such facilities in this state.
And then the court, quoting from another Illinois case,' 4 made the
very significant statement:
After the event, hindsight makes every occurrence foreseeable, but
whether the law imposes a duty does not depend upon foreseeability
alone. The likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of
guarding against it and the consequences of placing that burden
upon the defendant, must also be taken into account.
Consequently, the court did not sanction recovery for injuries sus-
tained by a three and one-half-year-old child.
Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Charge of Improper Supervision
A defense frequently presented to an allegation of negligent super-
vision is the assertion that the injured pupil was himself guilty of
contributory negligence. In certain jurisdictions which permit use of
formula, an effort is made to reduce damages through a comparative
negligence formula.
The problem with contributory negligence as a defense is that the
court uses as a yardstick that degree of care which the great mass of
children of like age, intelligence, and experience would ordinarily exer-
cise under the circumstances. The danger is that the court may often
conclude that, although pupils recognize that a warning of danger has
been given, they do not fully comprehend the extent of the danger. The
court is quite likely to see in the failure to properly supervise the cre-
ating of an improper atmosphere of temptation to experiment. As the
age of the pupil advances into senior high school, it is quite likely that a
court would find contributory negligence if the evidence indicated that
the pupil had been thoroughly instructed as respects the danger of care-
less conduct. On the other hand, courts will follow the philosophy of a
recent decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina which held that,
as a matter of law, a six-year-old child is incapable of contributory
negligence. 15
The duty of one charged with supervising to warn of danger often
exists even though a pupil could recognize some danger. In a California
situation the teacher failed to warn that the guard on a power saw was
broken. Although the pupil could observe the fact and knew of the
danger, the court held that, although the pupil did know there was some
danger, he did not know the amount of it.' 6
14 Lance v. Senior, 36 fI1. 516, 224 N.E. 2d 233 (1967).
15 Chimerofsky v. School Dist. No. 63, 121 Ill. App. 2d 371, 257 N.E. 2d 480 (1970).
16 Ridge v. Boulder Creek Union Jr.-Sr. High School Dist., 60 Cal. App. Zd 453, 140
P. 2d 990 (1943).
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Responsibilities Other Than Supervising
There are a number of occasions other than in the area of super-
vision which can give rise to questions as to whether teachers and ad-
ministrators have used due care toward pupils.
The mere plea of good samaritan will not excuse the school man
who gives medical attention when he should recognize that he does not
know how to administer proper treatment. The question then becomes
a question of reasonable action under the circumstances. Sending pupils
home during the school day without making proper contact with parents
could result in liability if a child suffers injury or harm. The keeping of
pupils after school so as to cause them to have to confront conditions
which would have been absent if they had been dismissed on time can
bring liability if a pupil suffers harm. Sending pupils on errands both
within the school and outside the school can have unfortunate con-
sequences for teachers and administrators if the child is injured and the
errand has confronted him with risks not justified in view of his age and
experience.
Individual teachers and administrators often find themselves in sit-
uations where the law thrusts upon them certain responsibilities to warn
of defects in school property and to do what is possible to keep students
away from the danger.
Limitations of space do not permit a more extended discussion of the
non-supervisory responsibilities. A more detailed analysis can be found
in the article of the present writer in the Hastings Law Journal.'7
School District Liability
It is not the intent of this article to discuss the question of the
liability of school districts for the negligent conduct of teachers and
administrators. The same Hastings Law Journal just mentioned' s dis-
cusses such matter. In general, some jurisdictions follow the doctrine of
governmental immunity. Ohio is in this category. Other jurisdictions
have done away with such immunity either by statute or court decision.
17 Supra note 12.
18 Id.
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